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Abstract
This interdisciplinary co-authored Analysis piece introduces identity and integrity, which are 
argued to sit at the core of the person. It analyses approaches taken to these concepts by legal 
regimes, particularly in the context of individuals using artificial limbs or digital avatars. The piece 
concludes that law engages with identity and integrity to a limited and incomplete extent; and that 
law is thus inadequate in its engagement with the person, and its meaning making in this respect. 
This piece draws on two interdisciplinary funded projects, funded by the Wellcome Trust and the 
Arts and Humanities Research Council.
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1 Introduction
Law is one of the avenues by which we make meaning. It is, of course, a special avenue – or 
social institution – insofar as it contains strong purposive and coercive components. Law can 
facilitate or prohibit activities, and provide enforcement pathways for those facilitations and 
prohibitions. In so doing, law makes (and signals, though not always explicitly) value 
judgements about the utility and/or virtue of things, and of course, of ways of being. Law 
exposes, and helps remake, and sometimes embeds or ossifies social norms. In short, the 
law, through its expressiveness (i.e. through the oral and textual expressions that it makes via 
treaties, legislation, court decisions, and practices), is a core shaper of social expectations 
and behaviours.1 In addition to law, there are other avenues by which we give meaning to 
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) license http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
1Shawn Harmon, “Katri Lohmus, Caring Autonomy: European Human Rights Law and the Challenge of Individualism” (2017) 25 
Medical Law Review 1-9. For a study on the expressive function of legislation, see Patricia Funk, “Is There an Expressive Function of 
Law? An Empirical Analysis of Voting Laws with Symbolic Fines” (2007) 9 American Law and Economics Review 135-159. For 
observations on the importance of the expressive functions of courts, see Bora Laskin, “The Role and Functions of Final Appellate 
Courts: The Supreme Court of Canada” (1975) 53 Canadian Bar Review 469; William Rehnquist, “The Changing Role of the Supreme 
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goods, to actions, to institutions, and to individuals, and by which we revise that meaning, 
and so by which we understand our reality.2
Against this backdrop, in this Analysis we offer a non-exhaustive survey of two concepts 
that are key to the development of the person, namely ‘identity’ and ‘integrity’. We explore 
how the law approaches or understands them, particularly regarding their impact on those 
with physical disabilities. We draw heavily on our research in the disability setting, 
specifically involving disabled dance artists in the Arts and Humanities Research Council 
funded “InVisible Difference Project”3 (which has roots deep in the history of SCRIPTed),4 
and users of prosthetics limbs and gamers with digital avatars in the Wellcome Trust-funded 
“Identity and Governance of Bodily Extensions Project” (IGBE).5 These projects are both 
interdisciplinary, with empirical elements. InVisible Difference explored the relationship 
between dance, disability, and law and the need for legal, policy, and practical change; and 
IGBE explores the concept of extensions of self (both through artificial limbs and through 
digital avatars), with team members from law, performance, medicine, psychology, and 
sociology.
Our modest intent in this Analysis is to uncover the extent to which (some) laws are 
sensitive to the identity and integrity of persons, particularly those who use prosthetic limbs. 
First, we unpack the notions of identity and integrity as central to “meaning-making”, both 
generally and in the disability context.6 Equipped with the lens that these concepts provide, 
we then locate them in the broader legal landscape, offering an overview of the extent to 
which they are noticed, and how they are understood. This will also allow us to draw some 
preliminary conclusions about the extent to which the law empowers persons – and 
specifically prosthetic users – to act and participate in society.
2 Identity and Integrity: an introduction
In our previous interdisciplinary research,7 we explored the extent to which lived 
experiences of a person are intertwined with something which might be considered distinct 
from the person (e.g. a person controlling a digital avatar through a graphics tablet and 
experiences the avatar as being an extension of their own body); the links between a person’s 
Court” (1986) 14 Florida State University Law Review 1; Aharon Barak, “A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a 
Democracy” (2002-2003) 119 Harvard Law Review 19; Joanne Scott and Susan Sturm, “Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial 
Role in New Governance” (2006) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 565-594; Neil Siegel “The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship’ 
(2007) 86 Texas Law Rev 958-1032.
2Steven Krauss, “Research Paradigms and Meaning Making: A Primer” (2005) 10(4) The Qualitative Report 758-770.
3See Project website http://www.invisibledifference.org.uk/ (accessed 12 November 2017), which sought to extend thinking around 
the making, status, ownership and value of work by contemporary dance choreographers, focusing specifically on that made and 
performed by disabled dance artists.
4See Abbe Brown, Shawn Harmon and Charlotte Waelde, “SCRIPT: A Legacy of Vitality” (2015) 12(1) SCRIPTed 51-58, available at 
https://script-ed.org/?p=1935 (accessed 12 November 2017).
5See Project website http://www.pci.leeds.ac.uk/research/featured-research-projects/identity-and-governance-of-bodily-extensions-
the-case-of-prosthetics-and-avatars/ (accessed 12 November 2017); Sita Popat, Sarah Whatley et al., “Bodily Extensions and 
Performance” (2017) 13(2) International Journal of Performance Arts and Digital Media 101-104; and Shawn Harmon et al., “Bodily 
Extension and the Law: Medical Devices, Intellectual Property, Prosthetics and Marginalisation (Again)” (manuscript in preparation).
6There may well be other concepts of significance to prosthetic-users, but our research highlights these as particularly important, and 
they potentially have some resonance with the frameworks we are exploring.
7Charlotte Waelde et al., “A New Foundation: Physical Integrity, Disabled Dance and Cultural Heritage” in Sarah Whatley et al. 
(eds.), InVisible Difference: Dance, Disability and Law (Bristol: Intellect, 2017 forthcoming); Sita Popat and Scott Palmer, “Embodied 
Interfaces: Dancing with Digital Sprites” (2008) 19(2) Digital Creativity 125-137.
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dignity and their belonging to a wider community (such as that of disabled dance); and the 
need for a new approach to theorising dance made and performed by disabled dance artists. 
We concluded that the concepts of identity and physical integrity can be key to meaning-
making in these contexts, and more generally so regarding respect for the person.
This also draws on other scholarship relating to identity and its importance to the person. 
Identity is a contested and multifaceted concept, and it has subjective and objective 
elements.8 Subjectively, “identity” can describe a variety of elements such as core personal 
values and self-perceptions, and objectively it can cover public statuses assigned at birth or 
later, and also how we might be described by others. Identities, then, can be internal and 
fluid, and also external and more permanent.9 These factors can apply to all persons; 
however, they are of particular relevance to prosthetic limb users. Empirical research carried 
out in the IGBE project and explored in more detail in another output (which also explored 
identity and integrity in more depth) found that the identities of prosthetic limb users are 
often deeply entangled with the external device or body extension that is the prosthetic.10
A different connection exists between the prosthetic limb user and integrity. Scholarship 
shows “integrity” to have a moral focus, drawing on completeness; it also has links with 
different forms of insult or causing offence.11 Integrity is relevant here as prosthetic limb 
users’ physical integrity is often seen as lacking or having been undermined by their 
condition (here the absence or one or more limbs), and there is a perceived lack of 
wholeness.12 Conversely, however, there is a rich body of work arguing that physical 
integrity need not involve a so-called “normal” body; if one is born, say, with one hand, then 
having a body with one-hand is normal and the body has integrity – the body is, however, 
non-normative.13
Strong arguments exist, then, for identity and integrity to exist as concepts, and for them to 
be particularly relevant (in potentially conflicting ways) to the development and personhood 
of prosthetic limb users. From this theoretical and empirical base, we focus in this piece on 
some instances of how law engages (or does not engage) with these concepts.
8Augusto Blasi and Kimberly Glodis, “The Development of Identity: A Critical Analysis from the Perspective of the Self as Subject” 
(1995) 15 Developmental Review 404-433.
9Scott Lasch and Jonathan Friedman (eds.), Modernity and Identity (Basel: Blackwell, 1992); Donald Polkinghorne, “Explorations of 
Narrative Identity” (1996) 7 Psychological Inquiry 363-367; Leonie Huddy, “From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination 
of Social Identity Theory” (2001) 22 Political Psychology 127-156. For the construction of identity in specific settings, see e.g. 
Ingegard Fagerberg and Mona Kihlgren, “Experiencing a Nurse Identity: The Meaning of Identity to Swedish Registered Nurses 2 
Years After Graduation” (2001) 34 Journal of Advanced Nursing 137-145; Elisa Abes and David Kasch, “Using Queer Theory to 
Explore Lesbian College Students' Multiple Dimensions of Identity” (2007) 48 Journal of College Student Development 619-636; 
Jesse Smith, “Becoming an Atheist in America: Constructing Identity and Meaning from the Rejection of Theism” (2011) 72 
Sociology of Religion 215-237.
10Harmon et al. (manuscript in preparation), supra n. 5.
11Axel Honneth, “Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality on the Theory of Recognition” (1992) 20 Political 
Theory 187-201; Roberta Galler, “The Myth of the Perfect Body” in Carole Vance (ed.) Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female 
Sexuality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984) 165-172; Charlotte Waelde et al., “A New Foundation”, supra n. 7.
12Tomoko Tamari, “Body Image and Prosthetic Aesthetics. Disability, Technology and Paralympic Culture” (2017) 23(2) Body & 
Society 25-56; Shawn Harmon, Kate Marsh, Sarah Whatley and Karen Wood, “Moving toward a new aesthetic” in Sarah Whatley et 
al. (eds.), InVisible Difference, supra n. 7.
13Galler, supra n. 11; Sharon Betcher, “Putting my Foot (Prosthesis, Crutches, Phantom) Down: Considering Technology as 
Transcendence in the Writings of Donna Harraway” (2001) 29 Women’s Studies Quarterly 35-53.
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3 Identity and Integrity: and the Law
3.1 Identity
First, we acknowledge that the concept of “identity” is known to the law, but law’s 
interaction with the concept is often either indirect or non-explicit, or both. For example, the 
law acknowledges and shapes a range of phenomena that are pertinent to identity; it both 
confers and places restrictions on the rights available to certain groups based on identity-
relevant factors such as developmental status (i.e. the right of foetuses to legal standing and 
protection);14 sexual orientation (i.e. the right to marry,15 the right to work benefits);16 and 
gender (i.e. the right to be recognised as the sex/gender with whom they most identify).17 
Rather unexplored notions of identity have also been explicitly referenced by courts to 
inform ethical and legal arguments relating to kinship and new technologies such as in vitro 
fertilisation technologies. An example is Rose and another v Secretary of State for Health,18 
in the context of an application for judicial review (regarding disclosure of information 
about artificial insemination under a legislative regime which did not provide for this). The 
court found that information about biological identity went to the heart of identity and to the 
make-up of the person; and that identity included details of origins and opportunity to 
understand them, physical and social identity, and also psychological integrity.
Identity is also explicitly referenced or unavoidably implicated in a range of legal 
instruments. Most notable is the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which 
erects rights in respect of private life (which was discussed in Rose), religion, and 
expression.19 From a disability perspective, the International Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (2006) (CRPD) provides for respect for the right of children with 
disabilities to preserve their identities,20 and General Comments21 in respect of it explore 
layers of identity in the context of discrimination22 and linguistic identity in the context of 
the deaf.23
A review of legal instruments and usage, however, also demonstrates that identity is not 
understood uniformly. For example, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 
14Vo v France (2005) 40 EHRR 12. For more examples, see Aurora Plomer, “A Foetal Right to Life? The Case of Vo v France” 
(2005) 5 Human Rights Law Review 311-338.
15International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (hereafter ‘ICCPR’), art 23(2); Ignacio Saiz, “Bracketing Sexuality: 
Human Rights and Sexual Orientation: A Decade of Development and Denial at the UN” (2004) 7 Health and Human Rights 48-80.
16International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) hereafter ‘ICESCR’, arts 6(1), 7.
17On basis European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Rights (1951) (hereafter ‘ECHR’), art 8 right to private life, see 
also Goodwin v United Kingdom (28957/95) [2002] I.R.L.R. 664.
18Rose and another v Secretary of State for Health [2002] EWHC 1593 (Admin).
19Although note that each have their own limits. For more on rights and identity, see Jill Marshall, Personal Freedom through Human 
Rights Law? Autonomy, Identity and Integrity under the European Convention on Human Rights (Leiden: Brill, 2008); Jill Marshall, 
Human Rights Law and Personal Identity (London: Routledge, 2014); Romina Sijniensky and N Alexander Aizenstatd, “Towards a 
Uniform Basis for the Right to Identity in the Normative Framework of the American Convention on Human Rights’ (2014) 7 Inter-
American and European Human rights Journal 75-92, in the context of disappearing children.
20Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) (hereafter ‘CRPD’), art 3(h).
21See Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities General Comments webpage, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
CRPD/Pages/GC.aspx (accessed 12 November 2017).
22CRPD General Comment No. 3 considering intersectional discrimination, building on layers of identities, and Daniela Ikawa, “The 
Construction of Identity and Rights: Race and Gender in Brazil” (2014) 10 International Journal of Law in Context 494-506.
23CRPD General Comment No. 4 regarding inclusive education, arts 9, 34 (b), 56. See also draft CRPD General Comment No. 6 
(April 2017) on CRPD, art 5 right of persons with disabilities to equality and non-discrimination, available at http://
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/CallPersonsDisabilitiesEqualityResponsability.aspx (accessed 12 November 2017) paras 
10 and 11.
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states that the child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from 
birth to a name, to acquire a nationality, and to know and be cared for by their parents.24 
Further, the parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, 
including nationality, name, and family relations without unlawful interference and also that, 
where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity, parties 
shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-establishing speedily 
his or her identity.25 Here, identity is associated with social connections (familial and 
community) insofar as they link to wellbeing, benefits, and traceability.
By contrast, the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) states that parties 
shall protect the dignity and identity of all human beings, and guarantee everyone, without 
discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with 
regard to the application of biology and medicine.26 Here, identity is linked to dignity and 
the capacity to hold interests and rights that create space to make personal decisions, and so 
is closely associated with autonomy. Finally, the UNESCO International Declaration on 
Human Genetic Data (2003) explicitly recognises the special nature of genetic data to 
individual and group identity, and emphasises it as a critical factor in meaning-making. It 
goes on to provide, however, that a person’s identity should not be reduced to genetic 
characteristics (because it involves complex educational, environmental and personal factors 
and emotional, social, spiritual and cultural bonds with others and implies a dimension of 
freedom).27 So again, identity as characterised by genetic characteristics and kinship is 
recognised as important. In contrast, the work of the UN Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (an appointment with, broadly, a mandate to lead and stimulate 
discussion and make recommendations regarding implementation)28 makes no reference to 
identity. Interestingly, however, the Rapporteur does focus on participation, inclusiveness, 
embracing diversity and change in social perceptions all points which can be argued to be 
relevant to identity.29
Law also provides opportunities for claims to be raised in respect of image, publicity, or 
personality rights, notably in respect of inaccurate claims of product endorsement and 
merchandising.30 The legal constructions for these rights are complex, drawing on the 
doctrine of passing off and Roman-Dutch principles of iniuriam – which builds in turn on 
Grotius’ claim that a man’s life is his own by nature, not indeed to destroy, but to preserve it, 
and so is his body, his limbs, his reputation, his honour, and his actions.31 This strand is 
another means of protecting identity. It requires, however, that necessary thresholds are met, 
24UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (hereafter ‘CRC’) art 7(1).
25CRC, art 8.
26Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and 
Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997), art 1.
27UNESCO International Declaration on Biological Human Data (2003), recital 6, art 3, 4.
28Appointed 2014, see UN Human Rights Officer of the High Commissioner Webpage http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Disability/
SRDisabilities/Pages/SRDisabilitiesIndex.aspx (accessed 12 November 2017).
29UN General Assembly. Human Rights Council. 28th session. A/HRC/28/58. Available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session28/Pages/ListReports.aspx (accessed 12 November 2017), paras 4, 19(a) (b) (c), 33(c).
30Mirage Studios v Counter-Feat Clothing Co Ltd [1991] FSR 145; Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch.); Fenty v Arcadia 
Group Brands Ltd (t/a Topshop) [2015] EWCA Civ 3; OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21.
31H Grotius (transl. A Campbell), De juri belli ac pacis Lib. II, Cap. XVII, II (NY: M Walter Dunne, 1901).
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notably that there is some form of reputation or goodwill (distinct from ownership but 
arguably analogous here), and then some activity and risk of damage.32
3.2 Integrity
Integrity is also encompassed by a range of human rights found in regional and international 
instruments. For example, the ECHR right to respect for private and family life discussed 
above has been held to “encompass moral and physical integrity and to extend to situations 
of deprivation of liberty”.33 There are also references to integrity in the CRPD and this is 
developed in General Comments.34 The CRPD provides that “[e]very person with 
disabilities has a right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity”.35 Further, the 
CRPD provides that states are to take all steps to protect persons with disabilities from all 
forms of exploitation.36 Finally, the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 
(2006) provides that in advancing science and technology, there is to be respect for the 
personal integrity of people with special vulnerability.37
At the national level and moving away from physical disability, integrity also informs the 
rights of those who lack capacity (i.e. who cannot exercise autonomy) to be protected, and to 
have decisions taken on their behalf only in support of their best interests. For example, the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005, which applies to England and Wales, articulates the key theme of 
“best interests” (i.e. decision-makers must take decisions on someone’s behalf that are in 
that person’s best interest as understood from the perspective of that person). The legislation 
also has a theme of “least restrictive means” (i.e. where a decision is taken that interferes 
with the person’s physical integrity, the option that represents the least restrictive means 
must be adopted – it must impose on them in a limited way and the idea of proportionality is 
important).38 When applying these tests (outside the prosthetic context), courts have seen 
physical integrity as important.39
4 A different perspective: disability
4.1 Law and disability
We can see, then, that the law does engage both directly and indirectly with the concepts of 
identity and integrity, which are so important to meaning-making, and so to personal 
32See generally Gillian Black, Publicity Rights and Image: Exploitation and Legal control (Oxford: Hart, 2011); Elspeth Christie 
Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law (W Green, 2010), 5-14; Grutter v Lombard (628/05) [2007] ZASCA 2. 
South Africa has used the question of identity in passing off and image personality type cases (ibid., paras 7 – 13); this is the converse 
of a developing debate in the law of passing off regarding how can brand owners protect their goodwill (for well-known celebrities 
arguably their identity) when it is being used beyond particular sets of goods. Here, the focus of actual self being extended, rather than 
its power being extended. See Catherine Ng, “The Law of Passing Off – Goodwill Beyond Goods” (2016) International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law 817-842.
33Husayn v Poland (2015) 60 EHRR 16 (ECtHR). See also Dickson v UK (2008) 46 EHRR 41 (Grand Chamber).
34References are made to integrity in draft CRPD General Comment No. 6 paras 5, 8, supra n 23.
35CRPD, art 17 also considered in CRPD General Comment No. 1 (regarding CRPD art 12 right to equal recognition before the law) 
paras 29, 31, 42.
36CRPD, art 16(1).
37Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2006), art 8.
38Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 1.
39See A Local Authority v K [2013] EWCOP 242 (Fam) regarding a person with learning disabilities and sterilisation as opposed to a 
coil para 26; Aintree University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] 3 WLR 1299 (SC) paras 19 et seq regarding 
withdrawal of treatment; and Mental Health Trust and others v DD [2015] EWCOP 4 (Fam) also on contraception and sterilisation 
paras 5, 84.
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narrative and worldview. However, we have seen that the law’s reliance on them is not equal, 
nor is the law’s understanding of them consistent. Further, the position of these concepts in 
specific legal regimes discussed (including those relating to disability) does not reflect the 
importance accorded to these concepts by prosthetic users as indicated by our empirical 
research and the scholarly arguments discussed above. In fact, when it comes to prosthetic 
users (and disabled persons more generally), the law engages more readily with the concept 
of disability. In so doing, however, it will be suggested that an overly narrow and 
problematic approach has been taken, which does not engage with the importance of the 
person.
International human rights instruments provides that everyone is entitled to dignity,40 and to 
certain economic, social and cultural rights which are viewed as indispensable to the 
achievement of dignity and the free development of personality.41 However, the focus of 
service-provision and rights-protection under these instruments has, in the main, been on 
ensuring survival, access, and participation.42 We have not seen a celebration of diversity, 
facilitating achievement of excellence (which has been achieved by people with disabilities 
in areas such as in sport,43 dance,44 or comedy45), or seeking to enable true flourishing.46 
Possible goals in this respect might be the requirement for elite funding across these areas47 
and the inclusion of this in international reports. This wider approach would be more 
consistent with a focus on the person and on engaging with identity and integrity.
This would also have an impact at the domestic level. So far, the UK Equality and Human 
Rights Commission48 and the Scottish Human Rights Commission49 tend to focus on food, 
housing, and basic employment. Their 2017 reports to the Committee of the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities emphasise (appropriately) dignity and autonomy, but 
then focus on identifying barriers to good standards of independent living, safety and 
accessibility, health, and life.50 The reports do not take the opportunity to construct body 
diversity as “normal” and as having a central place in the mainstream.51 They do not engage 
robustly with true equality and social justice for the individual person and the body/identity 
link – in essence, looking beyond functionality to an approach more integrated with creative 
and cultural expression and achievement and wider growth, reflecting developments seen in 
40Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereafter ‘UDHR’) (1948), art 1.
41See UDHR, art 22. There are also treaty references to culture, freedom of expression, and creative achievement: ICESCSR, art 
15(1)(a) and (c); ICCPR, art 19; CRPD, arts 21 and 30.
42See UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No. 5 (1994) paras 37-9 and UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No. 21 (2009) para 30.
43E.g. Paralympics at Rio 2016, available at https://www.paralympic.org/rio-2016 (accessed 12 November 2017), notably the 
achievements of Jonnie Peacock and Emma Wiggs.
44E.g. Caroline Bowditch, available at http://www.carolinebowditch.com and Claire Cunningham http://www.clairecunningham.co.uk, 
(both accessed 12 November 2017).
45E.g. The Last Leg, available at http://www.channel4.com/programmes/the-last-leg (accessed 12 November 2017).
46Marshall, Personal Freedom, supra n 19, pp 25, 26 considering Conor Gearty Can Human Rights Survive? (Cambridge: CUP, 2006) 
in particular pp 49, 50, 58, 141.
47E.g. building on UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No. 21 (2009) para 52 (d) regarding 
financial assistance, although this does not refer to disability.
48Equality and Human Rights Commission, available at https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en (accessed 12 November 2017).
49Scottish Human Rights Commission, available at http://www.scottishhumanrights.com/ (accessed 12 November 2017).
50UKEHRC, Disability Rights in the UK: UK Independent Mechanism Submission to Inform the CRPD - List of Issues on the UK 
(2017) http://www.scottishhumanrights.com/media/1559/crpdfeb2017ukimuksubmission.pdf (last accessed 12 September 2017); 
UKEHRC, Disability Rights in Scotland: Supplementary Submission to Inform the CRPD - List of Issues on the UK (2017), at http://
www.scottishhumanrights.com/media/1558/crpdfeb2017scotlandsupplement.pdf (last accessed 12 September 2017).
51For a wider discussion of disability and law, see Aileen McColgan, Discrimination, Equality and the Law (Oxford: Hart, 2014).
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the avatar context.52 The national position is also disappointing as the CRPD in its 
engagement with culture and sport refers to access, and to people with disabilities being able 
to fulfil their creative, artistic, and intellectual potential for their own benefit and also that of 
society.53 Accordingly, from this base, there remains the need for a strong call for true 
equality.54
4.2 Reflections
The narrow emphasis taken in the main to delivery of human rights at the international and 
national level may, arguably, be a natural consequence of the origins of human rights law (as 
a response to misdeeds perpetrated in World War II). It may also reflect widespread views on 
the appropriate limits of human rights (as tools for ensuring “freedom from” various 
activities by the state rather than anything more positive requiring substantial action or 
investment on the part of the state or others).55
The approach is also, arguably, a consequence of the “medical” model of disability that the 
law and powerful social actors (like the medical profession) have long held to and pursued. 
This sees disability as a problem to be cured.56 More recently, the “social” model of 
disability can be seen in the law. This model adopts the position that disability arises from 
social structures and environmental barriers.57 The Equality Act 2010, which is the UK’s 
response to the CRPD,58 contains hints of the social model with a focus on protected 
characteristics, which include disability.59 The legislation focuses on activities which a 
person may be able to do, or may be being prevented from doing because of their condition 
(again from the upright bipedal perspective); and the legislation imposes on the providers of 
services and also the public sector more generally (but not more widely) the obligation to 
make reasonable adjustments to practices and physical spaces to accommodate individuals 
with these characteristics – considering in detail employment, education, and property.60
52Given this narrow focus, it also interesting to note that debates have recently commenced around the creation of new rights to 
encompass the digital world and to better reflect our position(s) within it. See claims to rights of access to the internet (Labour digital 
manifesto, available at http://www.jeremyforlabour.com/digital_democracy_manifesto, and Nicola Lucchi, The Impact of Science and 
Technology on the Rights of the Individual (New York: Springer, 2016), pp. 31-96) and, in the light of the discussions above regarding 
digital avatars, note Jack Balkin and Beth Noveck (eds.), The State of Play: Law, Games and Virtual Worlds (New York: NYU Press, 
2006), and Ralph Koster “A Declaration of the Rights of Avatars”, available at http://www.raphkoster.com/games/essays/declaring-
the-rights-of-players/) (accessed 12 November 2017).
53CRPD, arts 30(1), (2), (5).
54For wider consideration of this, engagement with dance and the possible place of NGOs in CRPD monitoring, see Catherine Easton, 
“An Analysis of Reporting and Monitoring in Relation to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
the Right to Participation in Cultural Life and intellectual property” in Sarah Whatley et al. (eds.), InVisible Difference, supra n. 7.
55As such, economic and cultural rights were long seen as aspirational rather than enforceable. See Katherine Young, “The Minimum 
Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content” (2008) 33 Yale Journal of International Law 113-17; Tamara 
Hervey and Jeff Kenner (eds.), Economic and Social Rights Under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Legal Perspective 
(Oxford: Hart, 2003). However, such a narrow approach to human rights is increasingly questioned. See Jerome Bickenbach et al., 
“Models of Disablement, Universalism and the International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps” (1999) 48 
Social Science & Medicine 1173-1187; Rachel Hurst, “The International Disability Rights Movement and the ICF” (2003) 25 
Disability and Rehabilitation 572-576.
56See discussion in UPIAS Fundamental Principles of Disability (London: Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation, 
1976) and Bradley Areheart, “When Disability isn't just Right: The Entrenchment of the Medical Model of Disability and the 
Goldilocks Dilemma” (2008) 83 Indiana Law Journal 181-232.
57Colin Barnes and Mike Oliver, “Disability Rights: Rhetoric and Reality in the UK” (1995) 10(1) Disability and Society 111-116; 
Colin Barnes “The Social Model of Disability: Valuable or Irrelevant” in Nick Watson et al. (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of 
Disability Studies (London: Routledge, 2012) pp. 12-29.
58Consider CRPD, preamble c; compare ICCPR, art 2(1) and ICESCR art 2(2). Note also Colin Barnes and Geoffrey Mercer (eds.), 
The Social Model of Disability: Europe and the Majority World (Leeds: The Disability Press, 2005).
59See Equality Act 2010 (hereafter ‘EA 2010’), chapter 1 and s 6.
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The social model also underlies the Scottish Government’s 2016 “A Fairer Strategy for 
Disabled People”, which was built on strong engagement with disabled people.61 Yet the 
social model, in turn, has been challenged by the “affirmative” model. This model focuses 
on what people can do rather than on what they cannot do.62 And it is this mode which 
would enable greater (indirect) delivery of identity and integrity and regard to the person, 
through requiring, say, equality of funding and equality of programming of events and 
through which wider society could be transformed through inclusion.
5 Delivery
Finally, quite apart from substantive challenges to law’s engagement with integrity and 
identity, it should be noted that the ability to bring an action to pursue identity and integrity 
can be limited. One needs a claim that fits into a specific framework, such as a claim for 
privacy with the necessary requirements being met,63 a claim for paternity recognition,64 a 
demand for a particular activity to be prevented,65 or an application for judicial review as 
seen. The existence of national human rights legislation – such as the UK’s Human Rights 
Act 1998 – does not mean that the human rights discussed above are direct or easily 
accessed pathways to national courts.66 Further, the Equality Act 2010 does not impose 
obligations on all.
To address this, there should be an imposition of equality obligations on all at the national 
level; a right to pursue these obligations directly at court; and a clearer international 
requirement for countries to invest in and report on how they are supporting an affirmative 
approach to diversity (rather than merely enabling physical access and basic mobility). The 
first two would be a significant change given the place of human rights and treaties in the 
UK, and the third is inconsistent with the present international framework. All three are, 
however, consistent with the 2017 CRPD draft General Comment regarding equality and 
non-discrimination.67 And the proposals are necessary to enable law to provide an 
appropriate place for integrity, identity, and the person.
60See EA 2010, s 1, 20, 29, 36 et seq, 39 et seq, 84 et seq 149, Schedules 2-4. See also reflections in the work of the Rapporteur, see 
Human Rights Council supra n 29.
61Scottish Government, “Our Delivery Plan to 2021 for the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, 
available at http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2016/12/3778/5 (accessed 12 November 2017).
62John Swain and Sally French, “Towards an Affirmation Model” (2000) 15(4) Disability and Society 569-582. See also discussion in 
Abbe Brown and Charlotte Waelde, “Human rights, Persons with Disabilities and Copyright” in Christophe Geiger, (ed.), Research 
Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015) pp. 577-602.
63Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL); Weller v Associated Newspapers [2016] 3 All ER 357 (CA).
64Mandet v France, Application No. 30955/12, 14 January 2016, ECtHR (Fifth Section), reported in French.
65Such as criminal digital profiling. See Marper v United Kingdom (30562/04), (2009) 48 EHRR 50; Z v Finland (22009/93) (1998) 
25 EHRR 371; Karolina La Fros-Owczynik, “Minor Protection nor Major Injustice? – Children’s Rights and Digital Preventions 
Directed at Youth in the Dutch Justice System” (2015) 31(5) Computer Law & Security Review 651-667. Regarding digital identity 
more generally, see Clare Sullivan and Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon, “Digital Identity and French Personal Rights – A Way Forward in 
Recognizing and Protecting an Individual’s Rights in his/her Digital Identity”(2015) 31(2) Computer Law & Security Review 
268-279; Roger Brownsword, “Friends, Romans, Countrymen: Is There a Universal Right to Identity?” (2009) 1(2) Law, Innovation 
and Technology 223-249.
66See Human Rights Act 1998, ss3 and 6; ECHR, art 34; Spencer v United Kingdom (1998) 25 EHRR CD105; and Optional Protocol 
to CRPD (2006), in force May 2008.
67See draft CRPD General Comment No. 6 supra n 23.
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6 Conclusion
Identity and integrity have been identified by empirical and conceptual work as being at the 
core of the person. This analysis reveals, however, that they are not accorded such 
importance by the law. There are various legal tools by which one might seek to pursue or 
defend identity or integrity. The focus of the legal action, however, will not come under 
those terms; the relevant laws and pathways operate without a focus on the person. Law is 
failing, then, in its meaning making to address the person – indeed, the person is peripheral. 
This was a disappointing message for the lawyers to report to interdisciplinary colleagues; 
and in our ongoing work building on the InVisible Difference and IGBE projects, we argue 
for change in this respect. Three rather radical proposals have been made here as to how law 
can be adapted. This would create wider obligations to address inequality, more focus on 
existing human rights which address the whole of the person, and also on the person’s 
opportunities to engage across society. This would go some way to creating a new reality for, 
and meaning in respect of, the person. Law might not be willing to accommodate such 
radical proposals that run to the heart of disability and human rights legislation. If so, law 
will continue to fail in its meaning-making.
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